All rights reserved. Working papers are in draft form and are distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only and may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder.
The contents of this paper reflect the views of the author and do not represent the official views or policies of the Centre for International Finance and Regulation or any of their Consortium members. Information may be incomplete and may not be relied upon without seeking prior professional advice. The Centre for International Finance and Regulation and the Consortium partners exclude all liability arising directly or indirectly from use or reliance on the information contained in this publication.
Introduction
In March 2013, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has proposed to increase the 15% Basel II/III asset correlation for mortgage loans with higher loan-to-value ratios (LTV) (see Irvine, 2013) . The proposal includes an asset correlation of 20% for loans with an LTV between 80% and 90% and an asset correlation of 21% for loans with an LTV in excess of 90%. These changes aim to reect a higher exposure to systematic risk for high LTV loans.
While this proposal applies to New Zealand, it is an interesting starting point for a global discussion as (i) in particular high risk loans (e.g., high LTV or sub-prime loans) were exposed to large credit losses in the US during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and (ii) our knowledge on the exposure of mortgage loans to systematic risk is limited.
The industry measures the exposure to systematic risk with the concept of asset correlations and the link between asset correlations and default probabilities is controversial. Prior literature has focused on corporate loans. Grundke (2008) provides an overview of empirical studies on asset correlations including data sources and estimation methods for corporate exposures and the relationship of correlations to default probabilities and rm size. Sironi and Zazzara (2003) , Lopez (2004) , and Das et al. (2007) nd that asset correlations decrease with increasing probabilities of default (PD) and decreasing size of Italian and US corporate loans.
Contrary to this, Dietsch and Petey (2004) nd a positive relationship of asset correlation and default probability for European small and medium enterprises. In addition, some papers explain the time-varying co-movement of defaults based on macroeconomic variables and latent risk factors (see e.g., Due et al. (2009) who model latent factors conditional on observable macroeconomic information, i.e., frailty). Demchuk and Gibson (2006) use exclusively macroeconomic variables for modeling US corporate default rates. Koopman et al. (2011) use latent risk factors and macroeconomic variables explaining US corporate default rates.
Empirical evidence on systematic risk of mortgage loans is limited. Most research has focused on the prediction of mortgage defaults and loss rates using borrower, loan and macroeconomic characteristics. For instance, Elul et al. (2010) and Goodman et al. (2010) investigate the impact of negative equity, illiquidity and unemployment on predicting mortgage default. Amromin and Paulson (2009) evaluate the relative impact of borrower, loan and macroeconomic characteristics on mortgage defaults and identify real estate prices as an important risk driver. Rajan et al. (2013) show that the deterioration of the accuracy of statistical default prediction model is triggered by the change in lender behavior as the level of securitization increases. Crook and Banasik (2012) forecast mortage default rates based on the mortgage rate and the real house price index. Cowan and Cowan (2004) model the variance of default events for bank-internal credit scores, FICO scores and other mortgage information. Jimenez and Mencia (2009) propose a state space model linking the default rates with both macroeconomic variables and a frailty risk factor for retail loans.
The contributions of this paper relative to the literature are as follows. Firstly, we focus on mortgage default which is an important credit exposure class with limited research on systematic risk. The paper provides a multivariate predictive model for mortgage default probabilities by incorporating signicant time-varying loan, borrower level as well as macroeconomic information. Scores provided by Fair Isaac and Co. (FICO), current LTV ratios and debt-to-income ratios are most predictive. We are rst in kind to control for real estate prices by computing the current LTV ratio (CLTV). Prior studies are based on LTV at origination.
We analyze the in-sample and out-of-time prediction quality of this predictive model for mortgage default. Secondly, our paper is rst to measure total mortgage risk and decompose the total risk into systematic and non-systematic class-specic risk by controlling for the credit quality (i.e., the default threshold). The structural single factor model underlying the Basel framework is extended via a state space model with multiple risk factors and associated parameters estimated by the maximum likelihood method with Kalman ltering. The resulting parameter estimates may provide benchmark values for regulatory input parameters. The paper extends Cowan and Cowan (2004) who focus on the variance of default events which endogenously co-moves with credit quality but do not measure systematic risk conditional on the credit quality. The paper also builds on the paper by Jimenez and Mencia (2009) which analyzes macroeconomic time series information but does not control for mortgage-specic information, as well as interaction between such information and the economy (e.g., CLTV) and the clustering of risk with regard to the credit quality. The decomposition of total risk into systematic and non-systematic risk is important as some banks are able to diversify the non-systematic risk of dierent classes while others are not able to diversify due to inecient lending markets. Banks often have a business model that concentrates on lending to a particular risk segment such as prime or sub-prime loans, primary lending or renancing. Thirdly, our study extends the literature in relation to the econometric framework as multiple latent variables are included in a model and auto correlations are modeled through rst order auto regressive processes. This allows banks to quantify past realizations of systematic risk and include these into their predictory mortgage models. Fourthly, the paper analyzes the time series properties for all parameters and pre-crisis as well as crisis information.
The study is important as mortgage loans are the largest asset class in commercial banking and losses in relation to mortgage loans have triggered the failure of a large number of nancial institutions in recent years. The understanding of the exposure to systematic and to nonsystematic risks is central to the ecient allocation of capital in relation to minimum reserve and capital requirements. Our study is based on a large loan-level data set on US sub-prime mortgage loans. The paper's ndings are as follows. Firstly, a mortgage's total risk relates to the probability of default in a smile-shaped pattern: the total risk rst decreases and then increases with increasing unconditional default risk.. Note that the large changes in mortgage default rates which were observed during the GFC do not necessarily imply high exposures to systematic risk. This is due to the dependence of the default rate volatility on both the unconditional probability of default and systematic risk as shown in Gordy (2000) . However, the argument holds for given unconditional PD level, which is why we analyze systematic risk and nonsystematic risk by controlling for credit quality. Secondly, systematic risk increases as the credit rating of mortgage decreases, while non-systematic risk decreases as the credit rating of mortgage decreases. Lower rated mortgages are more sensitive to systematic risk than higher rated mortgages. Thirdly, total risk increases during and after the GFC. However, the increase of total risk results from non-systematic risk for the lowest risk class and from systematic risk for the remainder of the risk classes. Fourthly, the impact of systematic risk is persistent whereas the impact on non-systematic risk is temporary. Finally, the regulatory capital given the current asset correlation regime of 15% is found to be sucient for all risk classes and all observation periods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a methodological approach to measure PD, systematic risk and non-systematic risks and their relationship.
Section 3 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics for mortgagee, mortgage collateral and economic characteristics and presents estimation results and empirical ndings.
PDs are estimated via a point-in-time Probit model using information available at origination and observation times for mortgages. Information relates to mortgagees, collateral and the economy. Point-in-time models consider time-varying information, since default probabilities change with the state of the economy. 1 Consistent with current industry practice, rating classes are assigned based on the estimated probabilities of default (or alternatively credit scores). Then the rating class-level historical default rates are simultaneously modeled by a state space model with multiple risk factors: systematic and class-specic risk factors for investigating systematic and non-systematic risks for mortgage exposures. Consistent with the data, all risk factors are assumed to be autoregressively correlated to capture the time dependence of historical default rates. The state space model is estimated for various time periods to examine the serial change of unconditional PD, systematic and non-systematic risks. Section 4 calculates the regulatory capital given the PD estimates and investigates the adequacy of regulatory capital for mortgage portfolios under the current regime and modelimplied as well as data-implied exposures to total risk. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses implications for prudential regulation.
Methodology
The methodological procedure of this study is as follows. Section 2.1 estimates individual PDs of mortgages via a Probit model incorporating various borrower, loan, collateral and macroe-1 Compare Loeer (2004) for a comparison of default probability models. conomic characteristics for dierent estimation periods. Section 2.2 explains the categorization of mortgage loans into ten risk classes based on the estimated PDs. In Section 2.3, the conditional PD is derived for autoregressively correlated risk factors. Section 2.4 establishes a state space model with multiple latent risk factors for estimating class-wide PDs, systematic risks and non-systematic risks.
2.1
Mortgagee default process and unconditional probability of default
Based on the theory of Merton (1974) , a mortgage borrower defaults on a loan when the latent asset value falls below the nominal amount of debt at maturity (the default threshold). We follow the contributions by Gordy (2000 Gordy ( , 2003 and Vasicek (1991 Vasicek ( , 1987 and assume that idiosyncratic risk is fully diversied in a bank portfolio which is innitely granular. 2
The asset return of mortgage borrower i (i = 1, ..., I) in period t (t = 1, ..., T ) is driven by a common time-specic systematic risk factor F t and an idiosyncratic (i.e., diversiable) factor i,t :
where F t and i,t are standard normally distributed and independent from each other, with standardized weights √ ρ i and √ 1 − ρ i with values between zero and one. 3 Note that ρ i is the exposure to systematic risk and known as the asset return correlation in the literature.
A default event occurs when and if the asset return V i,t on assets falls below threshold h i,t−1 :
with h i,t−1 = βx i,t−1 , where x i,t−1 = (x 1 i,t−1 , x 2 i,t−1 , ..., x p i,t−1 ) is a information on the mortgage borrower, the mortgage loan, the loan collateral and the economy which is observable in time t and before. β is a vector of the respective sensitivities.
The borrower default is modeled by the indicator
The unconditional default probability of the borrower is given by: For an assigned mortgage borrower i in risk class g, the asset value return at time t is extended to a class-specic non-systematic risk component and an idiosyncratic error term:
where ρ g is a mortgage borrower i's systematic sensitivity to a systematic risk factor F t and α g is the factor loading to a class-specic risk factor Z g,t . Both parameters are dened between zero and one. Note that parameter sensitivity to the systematic risk factor is now group-specic, i.e., √ ρ g . The idiosyncratic factor i,t ∼ N (0, 1) is independent from F t and Z g,t . All risk factors are assumed to be unobservable and their unconditional distributions are supposed to be standard normal. These assumptions are common in the credit risk models since the introduction of CreditMetrics (2007) and consistent with the model assumption in current prudential regulation as shown in McNeil et al. (2005) and Lando (2003) . Suppose thatṼ i,g,t andh g are the unknown true asset return and default threshold of mortgage i in risk class g at time t, respectively. McNeil et al. (2005) show that the two threshold models (V i,g,t , h g ) and
h g ), and if the two asset returns have the same multivariate dependence structure between mortgages (multivariate normal herein). Note that if α g = 0 then ρ g represents the pairwise asset correlation of the asset value return process of two borrowers in class g which is consistent
with the exposure to a single systematic risk factor underlying the Basel framework.
For the asset return process in Equation (5), the total risk of a mortgage borrower can be represented as the additive sum of systematic risk, class-specic non-systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk:
Mortgage credit portfolios consist of large numbers of loans with almost equal weights (given the same vintage). Therefore idiosyncratic risk (1 − ρ g ) (1 − α g )is diversied away in such portfolios. Thus, the total risk (σ g ) of risk class is simply composed of systematic risk (ρ g ) and non-systematic risk (α g ):
whereα g = (1 − ρ g ) α g . The asset correlation between two borrowers i and j within the same risk class is equal to the total risk since
The asset correlation between two borrowers i and j in dierent risk classes is
We denote D i,g,t as the default indicator for mortgage i at time t, taking either zero or one for a default threshold h g,t−1 , i.e.,
otherwise.
Then the unconditional PD of risk class g is
where Φ (·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Note that the default is now class-specic due to our homogeneity assumption.
Conditional on F t = f t and Z g,t = z g,t , the PD of mortgage i in the risk class g at time t is given by
where p g is a class-wide unconditional PD of mortgages in the risk class g satisfying p g = Φ (h g,t−1 ).
Given the total number of mortgages in the risk class g, N g,t , the default rate of the risk
The default rate r g,Ng,t converges to the conditional default probability p g (f t , z t ) as N g,t increases to innity tby the law of large numbers, i.e.,
Then the default rate is
For the time dependence of the default rates, we assume an AR(1) process for the systematic and class-specic risk factors:
where
Note that the unconditional mean and variance of the systematic and class-specic risk factors are zero and one, respectively.
State space model for default rate
The conditional default rate in Equation (10) can be re-parametrized as the Measurement Equation for linearity and simplicity:
for all g = 1, 2, · · · , G, where
The State Equation is constructed by the systematic and class-specic risk factors as
, F is the diagonal matrix of the auto regressive coecients in Equation (11) and Equation (12)
is a white noise vector such that
In the above, Q = I G+1 − F 2 and I G+1 is the ((G + 1) × (G + 1)) identity matrix. Note that there is no measurement error in the Measurement Equation (13) since we assume that every risk class includes a large enough number of homogeneous mortgages. 4 The state space model for default rate with the Measurement Equation (13) 3 Empirical Results
Data
The paper is based on loan level data on US securitized non-agency mortgage loans. The data was collected from monthly loan tapes for residential mortgage-backed securities by International Financial Research and matches the data from Rajan et al. (2013) , who show that up to 90% of all US sub-prime mortgage loans are securitized.
The data set comprises 4,978,076 loans observed at quarterly intervals from 2000 to 2012.
We record 1,143,228 loan foreclosure events (many during the GFC in 2007 and thereafter).
The total number of loan-quarter observations is 56,946,616. We dene the default event as loan foreclosure. Observations with missing values in key variables were omitted from the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the number of observations per origination and observation year.
Consistent with Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) origination years immediately prior to the GFC and observation years during the GFC have a larger proportion of default events.
[ Table 1 about here.] [ Figure 1 about here.]
Loss rates given default (LGDs) are recorded at default for individual mortgages. 5 The aggregated loss ratio given default in Figure 1 is calculated as the ratio of all losses over a given quarter to the outstanding account balance at the time of default for the quarter. The gap between the two lines is proportional to the recovery. The default rates and loss rates given default increase during economic downturns.
Mortgage information at origination
Mortgage-specic variables at origination include origination year (OY), ARM indicator (ARM), FICO score (FICO), original balance, original appraisal value of the collateral/property (OAV), original loan-to-value ratio,owner occupancy type (OWNOCCP) and dwelling type (DWLTYPE). Table 2 and Table 3 describe these variables for default and non default observations.
[ The FICO score measures the credit worthiness of a borrower using information from 5 Section 4 includes LGDs in the computation of Basel capital and implied capital.
borrower credit les. A higher FICO score implies a higher credit quality. The average FICO score of defaulted mortgages is 30 points lower than for non-defaulted mortgages. The average original balance is 3.6% larger for defaulted than for non-defaulted mortgages. The mean of appraisal values of the collateral (i.e., the nanced real estate) is $40,000 smaller for defaulted mortgages than for non-defaulted mortgage. The mean of original LTV ratio is 8% higher for defaulted mortgages than non-defaulted mortgages. The ARM indicator denotes whether
or not a mortgage rate may be adjusted after it is issued. Generally speaking, the mortgage rate is linked to a reference rate such as LIBOR for adjustable rate mortgages. We assign a code of 1 to adjustable rate mortgages and a code of 0 to xed rate mortgages. The default rate of adjustable rate mortgages is 1.7% higher than for xed rate mortgages in Table 3 .
The purpose of owner occupancy is classied into three types: residence (code=1), investment (code=2), and others (code=0). The code for residence includes both primary and secondary residence, the code for others contains tenant, vacant and unknown. Mortgages for residence and investment are 0.6% less risky in terms of the default rate than mortgages for other purposes. Dwelling type includes single family homes (code=1), planned urban developments (code=2), and condominiums (code=3), and others (code=0). Mortgages for planned urban developments and condominiums are 0.1% riskier than other purposes in terms of the default rate.
Mortgage information at observation time
Mortgage-level variables at observation time t are current balance (CB), and current loanto-value ratio (CLTV). The current balance of defaulted mortgages is on average $27,000 larger than non-defaulted mortgages.
The current loan-to-value ratio of mortgages is calculated using the Case-Shiller Index for 20 major metropolitan statistical areas in the US as follows. We rst compute the distance of individual mortgage properties to 20 US cities for which a Case-Shiller home price index is available (via a mortgage's property zip-code). If a zip-code is not available, then we use the zip code of the largest city in the state of the property in terms of population. Then, we select the closest Case-Shiller index for a mortgage property and approximate the current loan-to-value ratio at observation time t as
The current appraisal value (CAV) is modeled by the following approximation:
where CSI i,t 0 and CSI i,t denote the Case-Shiller Index at the origination time t 0 and the observation time t, respectively. For mortgages where the property zip code and state are unavailable, we use the 10-city composite Case-Shiller Index (CSI). 6 Figure 2 plots the CSI and shows the spectacular decline during the GFC. CLTV is 27% higher for defaulted mortgages than for non-defaulted mortgages in Table 2 .
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Macro economic information
Next to the Case-Shiller indices, we use the country-level debt-to-income ratio (DTI) from the Federal Reserve Bank. DTI is an estimate of the ratio of debt payments to disposable personal income. Debt payments consist of the estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and consumer debt. We chose DTI as it is common in banking and reects economic information such as growth as well as employment levels. Figure 2 shows the quarterly reported country-level DTI which is correlated with the level of default rate in Figure 1 .
Probit model
Based on the literature, we tested a wide range of mortgage variables and included the follow- Furthermore, we include dummy variables for the mortgage origination year which capture vintage eect and year-specic economic and market conditions. Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) show that mortgage loans which were originated just before the GFC have higher default rates than loans originated in earlier years. [ Table 4 about here.]
Our results in Table 4 are consistent with the empirical ndings in the literature. Most prominently, PDs increase with CLTV and DTI and decrease with FICO score. The marginal eect of those variables on actual default is highly signicant over time. PDs also vary with dwelling and owner occupancy types. As expected, investment mortgage loans are riskier than residential mortgage loans and single family mortgages are less risky than others.
The goodness-of-t statistics (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUROC), R 2 and pseudo R 2 ) generally decrease as the estimation time horizon expands towards 2012. This decline in accuracy of the Probit model is consistent with the nding by Rajan et al. (2013) who nd that default prediction errors increase over time and hypothesize that this is due to the degree of securitization on mortgages and lending standards. In addition, the trend persists after the GFC. Note that other explanations such as population changes in terms of number of mortgages or risk characteristics are also plausible.
The measure AUROC is based on the area under receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC). ROC curves are a common performance measure for ordinal rating systems. Figure 3 displays the true positives rate on the y-axis (sensitivity, which measures how well the model identies default) and the false positives rate on the x-axis (one minus the specicity, which measures how well a model identies non-default).
[ Figure 3 about here.]
The better a ranking/rating system is able to attribute non-impairment outcomes with lower ranks and impairment outcomes with higher ranks, the larger the area under the ROC curve is (AUROC, see Agresti, 1984) . The areas under the ROC curve are reported in Table   7 for the estimation and the prediction years.
These measures are common in the literature and can also be transformed into Gini coecients and therefore be expressed as cumulative impairment frequencies for ratings, which are sorted from high to low risk classes (compare, e.g., Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Jarrow (2004)).
Default rates of risk classes
Based on the PD estimates from the Probit model, we construct ten risk classes with a width of 30 basis points for the rst nine classes. Thus mortgages with PDs between 0 and 0.3% are assigned to the rst class while mortgages with PDs greater than 2.7% are assigned to the tenth (i.e., the last) class.
The PD boundaries are selected to ensure that all classes have large observation and default numbers. We calculate the actual default rate for the risk class g at time t as in Equation (9) for all classes. [ Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4(a) shows that riskier classes have higher default rate levels with higher volatilities over the entire time horizon. During the sub-prime crisis, default rates rise and absolute change rates are monotone in unconditional PD levels and therefore risk classes. This observation may imply that mortgages with higher PD are more vulnerable to external economic shocks and thereby more sensitive to the systematic risk, than mortgages with lower PDs. This is the working hypothesis for our study.
3.4
Results of state space model
The parameters of the state space model with the Measurement Equation (13) and the State Equation (14) are estimated by the maximum likelihood method with Kalman ltering. The original parameters are computed by reversing the re-parametrization in relation to the Measurement Equation (13). Standard errors are calculated based on the delta method.
[ Table 5 about here.] indicates the unconditional mean of the Measurement Equation and is proportional to the default threshold for risk class g. As expected, the default threshold increases as the credit quality decreases from class 1 to class 10. The parameter φ 1,g relates to the sensitivity of class-wide default to the systematic risk factor f t . The worse the rating class, the higher the sensitivity to the systematic risk factor. The estimates of φ 2,g show that the worse the rating class, the less the sensitivity to the class-specic risk factor. These ndings imply that the better rating classes are more exposed to the class-specic risk and the worse rating classes are more exposed to economic downturns due to their high sensitivity to the systematic risk factor.
The estimated auto regressive parameters for the risk factors in Panel B provide evidence for a strong time dependence of risk factors and thereby, the auto regressive dependence of systematic risk realizations.
Unconditional PD and total risk
The parameters of asset value returns in Equation (5) are calculated in Table 6 by applying the associated re-parametrization in the Measurement Equation (13) given the estimates of state space model in Panel A of Table 5 . The unconditional PD (p g ) and the systematic risk measure (ρ g ) monotonically increase as the credit qualities of risk classes deteriorate, while the total risk (σ g ) and the non-systematic risk (α g andα g ) decline with the unconditional PD.
[ Table 6 about here.]
For validation of our results, the estimated unconditional PD, the total risk and the sys-tematic risk from the single risk factor model in Vasicek (2002) are compared. Vasicek (2002) is equivalent to our model with α g = 0 for all g in Equation (5), i.e.,
where the systematic risk factor F t and idiosyncratic factor i,t follow independent standard normal distributions. Note that there is no class-specic risk and that the idiosyncratic risk should be diversied away for homogeneous portfolios in Equation (15). As such, the total risk is the same as the systematic risk, i.e. σ g =ρ g for the single factor model. Figure 5 shows the total risk and the historical average of default rate of the ten risk classes.
[ Figure 5 about here.]
The total risk of the state space model and the Vasicek model decrease as the credit qualities of risk classes deteriorate. On the other hand, Figure 4 (a) presents that the worse rated classes experienced more volatile default rates than the better rated classes. Note that the volatility of defaults depends on both the unconditional PD (p g ) and the total risk (ρ g )
under the single factor model in Equation (15) as shown in Gordy (2000) , 7 i.e.,
where Φ 2 (·, ·;ρ) is the cumulative density function of the bi-variate normal distribution with the correlationρ g which is the total risk or asset correlation of the risk class g and p g is the unconditional default probability. Cowan and Cowan (2004) model the variance of the conditional default probability, or alternatively the variance of the default rate or number of defaults. Note that this measure generally depends on the systematic risk and the level of credit quality. Figure 6 plots the estimated default rate volatility of the state space model and Vasicek model obtained by Equation (16) against the historical average of default rate of the risk classes. The volatility of the default rate depends on both systematic risk and the level of the credit quality, i.e. the 7 Note that systematic risk (ρg) and total risk (σg) are the same in a single factor model as mentioned earlier.
unconditional probability of default. The volatility increases as the credit quality of the risk class decreases while the total risk decreases as the credit quality of the risk class decreases.
The high volatility of high risk classes is related to the unconditional PD rather than to the total risk. The total risk plays a relatively larger role for the volatility of the default rate for the low risk classes which have small PDs but high total risk.
[ Figure 6 about here.] Figure 7 plots the estimated systematic and non-systematic risks against the average of default rate for the ten risk classes. The term non-systematic risk implies that banks are able to diversify this risk in ecient lending markets. However, banks often have a business model that concentrates on lending to a particular risk segment (and therefore unconditional PD levels) such as prime or sub-prime loans, primary lending or renancing. Such business models may imply that banks nd it dicult to diversify their loan portfolios across risk classes and the class level non-systematic risk may actually be interpreted as a systematic risk for such banks. Figure 7 shows that the systematic risk increases and the non-systematic risk decreases when the credit quality of risk class deteriorates.
Systematic and non-systematic risks
[ Figure 7 about here.]
These observations suggest that the simultaneous inuence of mortgage characteristics and systematic risk is not additive due to the interactions between them. In other words, the eect of systematic risk on default diers depending on the unconditional PD, i.e., the risk class.
Economic downturns may increase unconditional PDs and therefore the exposure to systematic risk. This may in turn result in a fortication of the conditional PDs. 
Serial change of risks during the GFC and thereafter
Consistent with this paper, Dietsch and Petey (2004) discuss the eect of the length of the time series of data on estimated asset correlations. They point out that historical data should cover at least one complete cycle of the economy in order to avoid a downward estimation bias of asset correlation. In addition, Lucas (1995) suggests that estimated asset correlations over short estimation horizons are generally low since defaults may occur due to idiosyncratic risk.
[ Figure 8 about here.] Figure 8 plots the estimated unconditional PD and total risk per estimation period. Figure   8 (a) shows that the eect of estimation time horizon is much stronger on the estimation of total risk than the expected loss (the unconditional PD). Thus, the length of estimation time horizon is more important for estimating risk measures. These results are consistent with Lucas (1995) and Dietsch and Petey (2004) .
[ Figure 9 about here.] Figure 9 shows the evolution of systematic and non-systematic risks of ten risk classes per estimation period. During the crisis, the systematic risk gradually increases across all risk classes except the lowest risk class.
The non-systematic risk also increases during the crisis but reverts to lower levels except for the lowest risk class. Figure 8 (b) implies that total risk increases due to the crisis and stays at a high level thereafter for all risk classes. Thus, these observations impliy that the increase of total risk stems from both systematic and non-systematic risks during the crisis and to a larger degree from systematic risk after the crisis.
3.5 Robustness checks
Prediction accuracy of the Probit model
This paper has used the results from the Probit models as a basis to measure unconditional risk with regard to systematic and non-systematic risk. The model has been assessed in terms of in-sample t statistics (see Table 4 ). We predict the PD of mortgages at the prediction year by providing the Probit model at the estimation time with changed borrower and loan characteristics of mortgages at a prediction year to assess the model accuracy out-of-time. We then calculate the AUROC. [ Table 7 about here.]
Like the in-sample AUROC in Table 4, Table 7 is consistent with Rajan et al. (2013) [ Figure 11 about here.]
Risk classication
We checked the impact of class boundaries and widths and therefore dierent observations and default numbers on the empirical results. The systematic risk factor (f t ) and class-specic risk factors (z g,t ) are induced by equally-weighted default rates of ten risk classes in the state space model. Thus, we test our empirical outcomes for an alternative risk classication with an equal number of mortgages in every risk class, i.e., 
Implication on regulatory capital
This section assesses the capital adequacy of the current regulatory regime and a regime which takes into account asset correlations based on our (lower) measures of total risk. As we measure default risk on a quarterly basis these sensitivities are not directly comparable to the Basel asset correlations and we proceed as follows: Basel capital We use the Probit model from the previous section to analyze the adequacy of regulatory capital by forecasting the default probabilities of future periods. We predict PDs for future periods one year ahead. In other words, we apply the latest Probit model for a period and apply future borrower, loan and macroeconomic information. 8 The annual PD is inserted into the formula of the Basel Internal Ratings-Based approach. The regulatory capital requirement for mortgage i at time t over a year risk horizon can be calculated by where EAD i,t is the exposure-at-default, which is equal to variable CB, LGD g,t is the downturn
LGD of class g. According to Basel (2006) , the downturn LGD at time t is calculated as the maximum of the exposure-weighted average loss rate given default during the estimation period subject to a Basel oor of 10%. p A i,t is the annualized unconditional PD of mortgage i at time t, respectively and ρ Basel is given as 15%. Then the regulatory capital ratio for the risk class g at time t over a year risk horizon is:
Implied capital -unconditional PD For mortgage i in the risk class g, the implied capital based on the predicted PD (p i,t ) and the estimated total risk (σ g ) is obtained bỹ
where the conditional PD is multiplied by the annualizing factor 4 since p i,t and σ g are on a quarterly basis.
The implied capital ratio for the risk class g at time t over a year risk horizon is:
Implied capital -conditional forecast PD Conditional on f t−1 and z g,t−1 , the implied capital based on the forecast PD and the estimated systematic risk exposures (ρ g ) and non-systematic risk exposures (α g ) is obtained by
and the conditional forecast of PD is multiplied by the annualizing factor 4 since the parameters are on a quarterly basis.
Loss ratio
We calculate the loss ratio given by
where D i,t is the default indicator in Equation (7). Note that a quarterly loss is annualized by multiplying the quarterly loss ratio by the annualizing factor 4. Figure 12 plots the Basel regulatory capital ratio, implied capital ratios and the loss ratio per risk class. The Basel capital exceeds the realized losses for all risk classes and all years.
Thus, the regulatory assumptio of 15% for the asset correlation is sucient to cover unexpected losses. However the regulatory approach may not be ecient. The empirical results may also support lower asset correlations, which are increasing with risk. Insucient capital allocations are possible for sub-segments, or alternatively, if the PD model is not updated over time. Our model-implied capital ratios were able to provide a sucient level of capital except for selected periods during the GFC when the increase in loss risk outweighted past experience.
[ Figure 12 about here.]
5 Conclusion and imlications on prudential regulation
Credit portfolio losses and therefore bank capital are substantially aected by the exposure to systematic and non-systematic risks. This paper estimates PDs, total risk, systematic risk and non-systematic risk of mortgage exposures and analyzes the empirical relationship between these measures.
We nd that the sum of systematic risk and non-systematic risk follows a smile shape. The decomposition of total risk into systematic and non-systematic risk shows that systematic risk increases and non-systematic risk decreases as the unconditional PD of mortgages increases.
This implies a higher sensitivity of high PD loans to changes in the economy.
By extending the estimation period from 2006 to 2012, this paper also investigates the serial changes of total, systematic and non-systematic risks during the GFC and thereafter.
The sub-prime crisis raises the total risk for all mortgages. However, the increase of total risk is mainly caused by non-systematic risk for mortgages in the lowest risk class and systematic risk for mortgages in other risk classes. The exposure to systematic risk increases permanently while non-systematic risk increases temporarily. Finally, this paper evaluates regulatory capital adequacy for mortgage exposures given the current regime of an asset correlation of 15% and nds that the regulatory assumption on asset correlation is sucient to cover unexpected loss.
A model-implied (and data-implied) regulatory capital approach may warrant a more eective capital allocation provided that PD models are periodically updated and that the time-lagged realizations of systematic risk and non-systematic risk are taken into account.
This paper also emphasizes an important role of the length of historical data for regulatory capital estimation. Basel (2006) proposes at least 5 years of data to estimate loss characteristics such as EAD, PD and LGD. We start with a slightly longer time series and demonstrate the change of parameter estimates during and after the GFC by sequentially updating our models for extended time periods. In particular, risk measures are more sensitive than unconditional
PDs to the duration of data in the presence of business cycles. 
The coecients of origin year (OY) dummies are skipped due to simplicity.These dummies are consistent with Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) . One, two and three asterisks indicate signicance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% condence levels, respectively. The assigned codes are ARM (1) and FRM (0) for ARM indicator, residence (1), investment (2) and others (0) for owner occupancy types and single family (1), planned urban developments (2) for risk class g = 1, 2, · · · , 10:
and Panel B shows the parameter estimates of the State Equation: This gure plots the aggregate default rate of the total portfolio and the loss ratio given default calculated as the aggregated loss over the aggregate outstanding balance at the observation time, i.e.,
where CB i,t , D i,t and LGD i,t denote the current balance, the default indicator and the loss-given-default ratio for the mortgage i at time t, respectively. The grey bars indicate years which include a period of economic downturn as indicated by the National Bureau of Economic Research. This gure shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve is a common performance measure for ordinal rating systems. The plot displays the true positives (sensitivity) and the false positives (one minus the specicity). The better a ranking/rating system is able to attribute non-default outcomes with lower ranks and default outcomes with higher ranks, the larger the area under the curve (AUROC, see Agresti, 1984) . This gure displays the estimated total risk from the state space model in Table 6 and the Vasicek model. The default rate per risk class is on the x-axis. The gure presents the variance of default probability in Equation (16) as shown in Gordy (2000) . The variance is obtained by var (pg (ft) |pg, σg ) for the state space model and var (pg (ft) |pg,ρg ) for the Vasicek model. The default rate per risk class is on the x-axis. The unconditional PD denotes the unconditional mean of the state space model (Φ (φ 0,g )) as in Figure 10 , the conditional forecast PD is obtained byr g,t+1|t = Φ φ 0,g + φ 1,g β fft−1 + φ 2,g βgẑ g,t−1 for g = 1, 2, · · · , 10, and the conditional PD is calculated bŷ r g,t|t = Φ φ 0,g + φ 1,gft + φ 2,gẑg,t , wheref t−1 ,ft,ẑ g,t−1 andẑg,t are the Kalman ltered risk factors at time t − 1 and t, respectively. The average default rate per risk class is on the y-axis. 
